

## Department of Stü. 2

### Action

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Info

FROM: Buenos Aires

T0: Secretary of State

NO: 1152, October 22, 10 A. M.

NLACT.

ELITE EYES ONLY.

Although naturally pleased to see Mr. McClintock at the last first phase of Department Circular telegram, we have no idea of confidence in his report. Mr. McClintock's statement and confusion. Foreign Minister's statement, however, Foreign Office official, in our view, will be puzzled by reference to intelligence on possible disorders of "unprecedented violence" if this unreported or unconfirmed by Argentine side. Foreign Office official also likely be puzzled by our report of imminent dangers and request for strengthening security measures in face circumstance that group of U.S. Mayors being entertained here in public function and Billy Graham preaching in Luna Park, obviously unwarned by us (and we do not feel authorized by reference Department Circular telegram to warn them or other U.S. citizens directly or through Consulate here or in Cordobay). Indeed, if Amador McClintock does not return in time to act on reference Department Circular telegram Foreign Minister will be additionally puzzled.

I will try field his questions and place major emphasis on Washington as source of intelligence reports in expectation evidence will develop so rapidly that initial skepticism and puzzlement soon will be forgotten. Should be noted, however, that October 21 Buenos Aires HERALD carried front page AP dispatch containing Pentagon denial of buildup for Cuban invasion and October 22 paper headline "White House denies

/ clarendon

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100-111111, October 1961, J. Edgar Hoover to Bureau Chief

Washington, D.C. 20535. In face of these reports (H.C. on 10/10/61, MT NEWS Broadcast had similar story), Foreign Minister Guido consider Washington "evidence" of upcoming Communist aggression as confirmation U.S. invasion plans and as Washington indicating Communists will react to "aggression" as publicly they have often said. Thus, U.S. will appear even to its friends as being at least unnecessarily disingenuous and as "provoking" reaction of Communist reaction.

Moreover, Foreign Minister or other high officials of Foreign Office officers bound unfavorably react to request for appointment with President Guido. He will normally and naturally prefer to wait receipt more concrete persuasive details concerning threat to Argentine security and U.S. interests here before agreeing to alert his Chief. He will probably, however, do so but with nagging and resentment at our seeming lack of trust in him.

Accordingly, urge amendment of instructions Department Circular 100-700 concerning initial contact with Foreign Minister Guido.

1. Sanction reference to and emphasis on Washington level of aggressive nuclear buildup in Cuba. This would put emphasis on Cuban Reds where belongs and reduce efforts to compare U.S. intelligence reports on domestic scene with those of Cuba and minimize otherwise certain skepticism and polarization.

2. Sanction reference to likely imminent message from President Kennedy to President Guido as basis for anticipating need for appointment with latter. Alternatively, delete reference in conversation with Foreign Minister to anticipated need for appointment with President Guido until letter from President Kennedy has arrived here.

Instructions requested NLACT.

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